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Lilian Bermejo-Luque has presented an account of when reasons are good reasons. At 
the core of the book is her account of arguing, of the contributions of logic, dialectics, 
and rhetoric, and the factors involved in evaluating argumentation. I shall concentrate 
primarily on Bermejo-Luque’s account of the logical dimension and the role of logical 
or semantic evaluation. First, we must state her understanding of argumentation and 
argument. 
 Bermejo-Luque characterizes “argumentation as a second-order speech-act com-
plex” (2011, 53; all page references below are to this book), a type of communicative 
activity. Justifying some target-claim is the illocutionary aim of argumentation, while 
persuading others of the claim’s being justified is its perlocutionary aim. Since speech-
acts may have both illocutionary and perlocutionary effects, and arguments are sup-
posed to both justify claims and persuade others, Bermejo-Luque sees a speech-act 
characterization of argumentation as especially apt. Particular argumentations, acts of 
arguing, consist of adducing and concluding. Adducing includes not only a first-order 
speech-act of asserting some proposition, but also indicating its functional role as a 
reason, and similarly for concluding, which indicates that some claim is the target-
claim.  
 Argumentation and argument are distinct. An argument is the representation of the 
propositional contents of a speech-act of arguing, together with their functional rela-
tionship. As a speech-act, argumentation is public. Parallel to these public acts are pri-
vate, mental acts of reasoning. Arguments may represent the content of the elements 
of either acts of arguing or reasonings. For acts of arguing, besides a target-claim and 
the reason for this target claim, “the implicit inference-claim that turns a mere claim 
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into a reason for another” (p. 56) constitutes an element in the act. Each of these ele-
ments has a “corresponding type and degree of pragmatic force,… made explicit by 
means of certain qualifiers” (p. 56). 
 Bermejo-Luque’s understanding of the inference claim some may find quite con-
troversial. Its propositional content is an indicative conditional whose antecedent is 
the propositional content of the reason and whose consequent is the propositional 
content of the target-claim. One might rather expect the content not to be a simple 
indicative conditional, but a generalized conditional, either universal or ceteris paribus, 
indeed a generalization supporting a subjunctive conditional. By contrast, Bermejo-
Luque holds that the propositional content is properly expressed as a truth-functional 
conditional, true if its antecedent is false or its consequent true. Such truth-conditions 
would not seem sufficient to express the expected connection between the proposi-
tional contents of the reason and the inference-target, or the corresponding premise 
and conclusion. To adduce a reason for a target-claim one asserts not just that if the 
reason is true, so is the target claim, but that the target-claim follows in some sense 
from the reason. There is some necessary (not necessarily logical) connection between 
reason and target-claim. Even with purely deductive logic, the truth of a material con-
ditional is not sufficient to show a claim of entailment. Likewise, post hoc ergo propter hoc 
is a fallacy. Consider this example (which is not original). Little Johnny walks up to the 
automatic door of a grocery store. He says “abacadabra” and the door opens. He then 
says that “If I say ‘abacadabra,’ then the door will open.” He means that if he were to 
say the magic word, the door would open. He means his incantation has causal efficacy. 
His conditional asserts more than merely that it is not the case that the antecedent is 
true and the consequent false. 
 Bermejo-Luque’s reply that the pragmatic conditions of asserting a reason for a 
target claim, that the reason is asserted and thus not known to be false by the speaker 
and that one does not know whether the target claim is true when being presented 
with such a reason (if one needs to be persuaded) does not rule out our counterexam-
ple. If Johnny argues that the door will open because he’s going to say “abacadabra,” 
and he intends to say the magic word, he certainly doesn’t know that the antecedent is 
false and neither he nor his interlocutors know by another means (presumably sense 
perception) that the door will open right after he says “abacadabra.”At the time of ut-
terance, it is a future event. We shall see later how this problem with Bermejo-Luque’s 
construal of conditionals corresponding to inference claims affects her account of the 
semantic appraisal of arguments and argumentation. 
 Turning to discuss the logical dimension of argumentation, Bermejo-Luque begins 
by stressing that logical normativity is only part of argumentative normativity and then 
clarifies that by “logic” she means not formal deductive logic but logic as characte-
rized by Toulmin in (1958). I find her argument for this view problematic. She charac-
terizes formal validity as having a valid logical form, which she equates with there be-
ing “an acceptable formal system in which it is valid” (p. 88). This characterization 
seems to confuse syntax and semantics. The concept of a formal system suggests a 
system for constructing formal derivations by observing syntactic inference rules. Va-
lidity can be characterized semantically through the familiar intuitive definition that an 
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argument is valid just in case it is impossible for its premises to be true together with 
its conclusion’s being false.1 Impossibility can then be explicated semantically, by ana-
lyzing the form of the component premises and conclusion at some level – sentential 
and predicate are paradigms – together with a statement of the truth-conditions for 
the logical constants encountered at this level. The deeper the analysis of form, the 
more adequate the explication. None of this involves inference rules. The acceptability 
of a formal system of rules is ultimately subject to verification through soundness and 
completeness results. To be sure, there are systems of non-classical logic such as intui-
tionism. However, if one contrasts the basic semantic values of truth and falsity for 
classical logic with proof values for intuitionist logic, one can find plausible Quine’s 
judgment that change of logic means change of subject (see 1970, 80-81). In this light, 
Bermejo-Luque’s remark that “given the existence of alternative formal logics ... such 
normativity regarding what we can or cannot infer seems far from obvious” (p. 88), 
and her reference to intuitionistic logic are unfortunate.  
 This fact has distinct implications for evaluating the very next point that she 
makes: “In my view, the only way to avoid this problem is to think of logical norma-
tivity as a matter of the constitutive pragmatic conditions of the type of acts on which 
inferences supervene, i.e. the acts of arguing and reasoning” (p. 89). To the contrary, it 
can be avoided by recognizing that the intuitive semantic characterization of validity 
captures our intuitions concerning this concept and that this concept can be explicated 
at various levels of logical form. Bermejo-Luque has put this argument forward, I be-
lieve, in part to highlight that we cannot appeal to a formal discipline of Logic to an-
swer in general questions of the normative appraisal of inference. We can agree with 
her without accepting the argument, since it is a commonplace that many arguments 
are non-conclusive. A general account then will involve more than formal considera-
tions. 
 Bermejo-Luque’s reference to constitutive pragmatic conditions is important for 
understanding her overall conception of argument evaluation. She continues by claim-
ing that when we put forward conclusions, we qualify them modally, i.e. “with a cer-
tain force, namely the epistemic pragmatic force which the modal qualifiers express” (p. 
90). This at first sight seems surprising. Do we not, on many occasions, put forward a 
conclusion as simply being true? In how many of the arguments we encounter can we 
find explicit modal qualifiers? Our reservations can be allayed somewhat when we re-
member that Bermejo-Luque counts “it is true that” as a modal qualifier (see p. 53). It 
can also be allayed when one remembers that in putting forward a conclusion, one 
lends one’s authority to it, at least to some extent, which can be indicated by a modal 
qualifier. Field dependent criteria, as Toulmin uses “field,” spell out the criteria for be-
lieving a conclusion as modally qualified. Bermejo-Luque now makes a point impor-
tant for the development of her account of logical normativity. Any statement can be 
modally qualified, including the material conditional expressing the inference-claim of 
an act of argument and the statement of the data constituting its reason. That is, war-
                                                     
1 As Hitchcock points out, this definition can be refined to rule out paradoxes of relevance. See (1998, 
24-27). 
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rant and data can be modally qualified. The modal qualifier of the warrant entitles us 
“to draw our conclusion ‘necessarily,’ ‘probably,’ ‘tentatively,’ ‘possibly,’ etc.” (p. 91). 
Whether a qualifier is attributed correctly depends on whether its force expresses the 
force with which we should believe the statement it qualifies. Hence, “the validity of 
an argument would be a matter of the correctness of its warrant, and a good argument 
would be an argument whose conclusion has been properly qualified, given the qua-
lifiers that actually correspond to its data and warrant” (p. 91). By putting forward this 
characterization of validity and argument goodness, Bermejo-Luque incurs a very sig-
nificant burden of explication, if not burden of proof. We shall see how she discharges 
this burden in connection with examining her account of semantic argument appraisal. 
 Bermejo-Luque emphasizes that the concept of validity she is developing is non-
formal. A formalist might repond to her as he responded to Toulmin, that an appar-
ently non-formally valid argument was in fact an enthymeme. When the unstated 
premise is made explicit, the argument is seen as valid by virtue of its form. So a for-
mal theory of validity is sufficient after all. In countering this objection, Bermejo-
Luque makes an excellent point: Representing an argument with an apparently non-
formal inference rule as an enthymeme, the added premise involving a conditional, 
may very well misrepresent the structure of the argument as presented. Rather one is 
constructing a new argument with its own distinct warrant. That the formal approach 
depends on this misrepresentation is the main reason to abandon it (p. 97). 
 However, Bermejo-Luque’s next point is very questionable. She considers the ar-
gument “‘the position of the Sun, Moon, Earth are…; therefore, there will necessarily be 
a partial eclipse of the Moon’” (p. 97). She claims that this argument is valid and con-
clusive, without its “completion” by adding a premise incorporating ‘a good deal of 
astronomical theory’” (p. 97). Rather “the argument is conclusive and valid because 
the claim that its warrant represents is not only true but necessary, and that good deal of 
astronomical theory only serves to let us know that the argument is indeed valid” (p. 
97, italics added). This is problematic. First, what is the sense of necessity involved – 
certainly not logical. The laws of astronomy are not logically true, although we could 
admit their having a natural necessity, if the evidence for them is appropriately large 
and varied.2 Hence they cannot render the warrant logically necessary. It would strike 
me as far more accurate to say that corresponding to the warrant as an inference rule 
is a universally generalized causally necessary conditional. That conditional is sup-
ported, i.e. backed, by astronomical theory and ultimately by the observational evi-
dence on which that theory is backed. However, this differs from Bermejo-Luque’s 
analysis on two points. Not only is this conditional not indicative, it is general. We 
have already discussed the first difference. We shall consider the second shortly. 
 Bermejo-Luque follows this remark with a discussion I find even more problemat-
ic. She says “the content of the claim that the warrant represents is that if the reason is 
correct, then the conclusion is correct; therefore, if this claim is correct in turn, if the 
reason is correct, then the conclusion has to be correct” (p. 129, italics added). In gen-
                                                     
2 This statement presupposes Cohen’s analysis of natural necessity as maximum inductive reliability. See 
(1977, 230) and the theory of inductive reliability developed in (1977). 
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eral, as long as the reason is correct, the modal qualifier of the warrant can be attri-
buted to the conclusion. On the face of it, this is just plain wrong. Given her distinc-
tion of ontological versus epistemic modal qualifiers developed in the last chapter of 
the book, Bermejo-Luque is not making such a bold statement. But let us see just why 
this distinction is problematic. That a conclusion follows necessarily from the premis-
es (that the warrant of the argument is logically necessary) does not mean that the 
conclusion of the argument is logically necessary. From the fact that “It is logically ne-
cessary that if Socrates is human and all humans are mortal, then Socrates is mortal,” 
we cannot infer that Socrates’ being mortal is a logically necessary truth. Such a view, 
as the mediaevals would tell us, confuses the necessity of the consequence with the 
necessity of the consequent. Similar remarks might be made for probability as a modal 
qualifier. 
 Turning now to warrants, Bermejo-Luque makes a good point that on her view, 
warrants can be easily distinguished from the premises of arguments. This is impor-
tant, because Toulmin’s discussion of warrants in (1958) is in desperate need of dis-
ambiguation. He has characterized warrants both as statements and as inference rules. 
But inference rules are not statements. Rather they are expressions of the sort 
 From  a statement of the form ϕ 
 To infer a statement of the form ψ, 
where ϕ, ψ contain variables or schematic letters of some sort which, when replaced 
by concrete expressions, result in concrete declarative sentences.3 That is, inference 
rules authorize a step from reason to conclusion. As such, steps from reason to con-
clusion instance these licences, but do not include the licence as a proper part. Hence, 
they are implicit not explicit in arguments. By analyzing a speech act of adducing – 
putting forward a claim as a reason for some further claim – as requiring attributing to 
the speaker an implicit inference-claim making the explicitly stated reason a reason for 
that claim, inference-claims are clearly seen to be distinct from the claims they consti-
tute as reasons. However, as our remarks immediately above identifying warrants as 
inference rules show, we do not need Bermejo-Luque’s proposal distinguishing acts of 
arguing involving inference-claims from the arguments instancing warrants which 
represent them to make the distinction. We have made it on the syntactic level by dis-
tinguishing statements from inference licences. 
 Taking this viewpoint, we reject Bermejo-Luque’s critique of Hitchcock’s claim 
that warrants justify inferences, by which he means a logico-epistemic justification. We 
justify a step in an argument by citing the warrant it instances. Whether the step is real-
ly justified is a matter of the reliability of the warrant, which is a matter of its backing. 
But in citing a warrant, we are not arguing from the warrant to an inference claim, as 
Bermejo-Luque alleges Hitchcock’s view involves. Such an argument would have its 
own inference claim, which in turn would need to be justified by a warrant, which jus-
tification involves a further argument, which… We have started an infinite regress. 
                                                     
3 We need not consider here the limiting case where ϕ, ψ contain no variables or schematic letters. 
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There is no argument from warrant to inference claim. Unless the warrant is chal-
lenged, citing the warrant is giving the justification fully. 
 Bermejo-Luque holds that “the idea that warrants are justifications for the infe-
rence is a hold-over from deductivism” (p. 111). She argues that within deductivism, 
justifying a claim involves showing “that such claim or belief will always be correct if 
the reason is correct, no matter how the world happens to be” (p. 111). This may be 
true of deductivism, but the requirement that inferences be justified does not entail 
this view. It is sufficient to point out that besides formal inference rules are material 
inference rules, as Toulmin does in (1958). Different fields may back these warrants 
and thus constitute them justified in different ways. Backing such a warrant “from be-
low” by citing a sufficiently large and appropriately varied body of instances is a para-
digm case. Such backing may certify that the warrant is reliable ceteris paribus, but falls 
short of necessity. But unless rebutted, the warrant is justified and it is appropriate to 
use it to justify inferences. 
 As our characterization of ϕ, ψ as containing variables or schematic letters indi-
cates, warrants are general. Hitchcock has argued–persuasively to my mind–for the 
generality of warrants or inference licences (see in particular 1985 and 1998). For 
Bermejo-Luque, inference-claims or inference motivations are not general. She argues 
“general rules are not ‘bridges’ between reasons and target-claims or indirect judg-
ments” (p. 108). She gives two reasons for this opinion. First, given a simple argu-
ment,4 we may frame a plurality of generalizations connecting the premise to the con-
clusion. I expect that the point is that given the argument, we cannot identify which 
general rule is the warrant. Hitchcock has dealt with this issue in (1985). For a premise 
to be relevant to a conclusion, there must be at least one content expression shared by 
both – there could be more. To be sure, one can formulate a plurality of connecting 
generalizations of different degrees of generality. But some may be distinctly implausi-
ble and others may be weaker than the maximally general plausible generalization. Im-
plausibility considerations act as a filter typically to identify a unique generalization 
corresponding to the warrant of the argument. 
 Bermejo-Luque’s second reason against saying that general rules are not bridges 
claims that “every general rule can have conditions of rebuttal applicable to the partic-
ular case stated by the argument” (p. 108). First of all, this is not true. A general rule 
can be conclusive (formal rules are the paradigm case) and thus not open to rebuttal. 
Secondly, generality does not imply non-defeasibility. A general rule can be defeasible 
and still licence a move from reason to conclusion. In this case, we are entitled to infer 
the conclusion only ceteris paribus or regard the reason as a prima facie reason for the 
conclusion. I would add further that unless the inference-claim or inference-
motivation focused on some general (albeit possibly defeasible) connection between 
reason and claim, it would be hard to see how it could function as an inference-claim. 
Put another way, to answer Toulmin’s warrant-generating question – How do you get 
there? – one must indicate some general connection between data and claim. Al-
though Toulmin allows “If D, then C” to frame the warrant, he indicates that a more 
                                                     
4 Bermejo-Luque cites Scriven’s example “She’s red-haired, so she’s probably quick-tempered.” 
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candid way of formulating it is to say “Data such as D entitle one to draw conclusions, 
or make claims such as C” (1958, 98; italics added). Although egregiously vague, the 
“such as” indicates generality here. Should someone ask why D is a reason for C, to 
answer “If D, then C” would provide no explanation. But to indicate that within D 
there is some feature that was generally connected to some feature within C would 
show the interlocutor at least why the speaker thought D was a reason for C. Hence, 
Bermejo-Luque has not established her account of warrants as truth-functional condi-
tionals. 
 Having identified reasons, claims, warrants, and modal qualifiers as elements in ar-
guments expressing argumentation and discussing how warrants should be unders-
tood, Bermejo-Luque presents her account of how the semantic appraisal of argumen-
tation proceeds with respect to these elements. She sees reasons, conclusions, and 
warrants of arguments as all being modally qualified and evaluation as determining 
whether they have been properly qualified. This account, then presupposes an exten-
sion of Toulmin’s notion of a modal qualifier. In his model, only the claim is qualified. 
She extends the notion further, distinguishing ontological and epistemic modal qualifi-
ers, “which correspond respectively to the semantic and argumentative value with 
which we can put forward a claim” (p. 170). She believes that the distinction is ex-
pressed in two forms of modal words. Should we say “p is true,” “p is necessary,” “p is 
possible,” “p is probable,” we say something about p’s “representativeness respecting 
the world” (p. 171). Such adjectival expressions are ontological modal qualifiers. By 
contrast, to say “truly that p,” “necessarily that p,” “possibly that p,” “probably that p,” 
is to say “something about the status of this claim as knowledge, about the confidence 
we should put in this claim or our entitlement to it” (p. 171). The adverbial expres-
sions are epistemic modal qualifiers. The qualifier of the target claim of an argumenta-
tion is epistemic, while the qualifiers of the reason and the inference-claim are onto-
logical. Furthermore, “the correctness of the epistemic qualifier depends on the onto-
logical qualifiers of the reason and the inference claim” (p. 171). 
 Bermejo-Luque indicates that “representativeness respecting the world” can be ex-
plicated through relative frequencies, which thus express facts about the world (al-
though this need not be the only way representativeness can be explicated). She says 
“if the relative frequency of an event of type A in circumstances C is 0.9, then we may 
say that a claim that in these circumstances of type C this event of type A is highly 
probable is correct” (p. 171).  
 I find this distinction in terms of grammatical form unsatisfactory. Consider a lo-
cution of the form “it is necessarily the case that A” (alethic necessity). On a possible 
worlds semantics, such a statement will be true just in case A is true in all possible 
worlds. But this is an ontological criterion, not making reference to any body of know-
ledge. We might better express this distinction through the familiar distinction between 
categorical and conditional probability. To assert 
Pr(A) = 0.6 
is to make an unconditional statement about A’s holding, e.g. 
The probability that the incumbent will be re-elected is 0.6. 
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By contrast, asserting 
Pr(A/C) = 0.6 
does not assert that the probability of A is 0.6 outright but only conditional upon C’s 
holding. It is making a claim about the evidential value of C with respect to A. 
The probability that the incumbent will be re-elected, given that the economy 
is growing at a healthy rate, is 0.6. 
Since a categorical probability assertion indicates something about a statement out-
right, its truth-conditions, on an objective interpretation of probability, depend upon 
something about the world, and this could rightly be described as asserting an onto-
logical probability. By contrast, a conditional probability asserts something about the 
evidential value of C for A, and could rightly be described as asserting an epistemic 
probability. 
 However, this understanding of epistemic probability which we are suggesting will 
prove very problematic, given how Bermejo-Luque wishes to relate ontological and 
epistemic probability in her account of semantic appraisal. The point is precisely this: 
Bermejo-Luque sees epistemic probability as qualifying the conclusion and this is cen-
tral to her account of semantic appraisal. On a conditional probability construal, epis-
temic probability qualifies the relation between premise and conclusion. It describes the 
strength of evidence, not the strength of the conclusion, if the evidence holds. 
 Bermejo-Luque considers several arguments to illustrate how evaluation should 
proceed. Consider the following: 
Premise:  “it is going to snow a lot” is probable (to a degree x) 
Warrant:  “if it is probable (to a degree x) that it’s going to snow a  
     lot, then it is probable (to a degree y) that the flight will  
     be cancelled” is probable (to a degree z) 
Conclusion: probably (to a degree z) “it is probable (to a degree y)   
     that the flight will be cancelled” 
(p. 176). She continues “for an argument to be valid its conclusion has to be qualified 
with an epistemic qualifier which corresponds to the ontological qualifier that correct-
ly qualifies its warrant” (p. 176). This example readily illustrates this point. The adjec-
tival qualifier of the warrant is simply converted to its adverbial counterpart to qualify 
the conclusion. So determining validity is a matter of determining the correctness of 
that ontological qualifier. Notice that the warrant’s qualifier is categorical, not condi-
tional. But since the warrant relates the premise to the conclusion, should not the war-
rant’s modal qualifier indicate the evidential value of the premise for the conclusion, 
i.e. should not the warrant’s qualifier be conditional and so epistemic? But claiming 
the warrant is probable to a degree z apparently asserts the ontological and presuma-
bly categorical probability of a material conditional.5 
                                                     
5 This could be a further reason for insisting that the warrant of an argument be a material conditional. 
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 However, there is evidence that Bermejo-Luque assumes the probability of the 
warrant is conditional. She says, when “the inference-claim ‘if John’s car is outside and 
he’s not in the living room, then he is in his room’ seems to us only probable – in the 
ontological sense we are assuming its degree of (ontological) probability could be de-
termined, for example, as the relative frequency of John’s being in his room when his 
car is outside and he is not in the living-room” (p. 172). That is, at least in cases of 
warrants, ontological probabilities are conditional probabilities. But this is wrong. In 
general, Pr(P ⊃ Q) ≠ Pr(Q/P), as Bermejo-Luque seems to be assuming here. Since  
‘P ⊃ Q’ is logically equivalent to ‘~P ∨ Q’, we have Pr(P ⊃ Q) = Pr(~P ∨ Q). Sup-
pose Pr(~P) = .9, Pr(Q) = .4, and Pr(~P & Q) = .35. Then Pr(~P ∨ Q) = [Pr(~P) + 
Pr(Q)] - Pr(~P & Q) = (.9 + .4) - .35 = .95. But also Pr(P & Q) = .05. Given the defi-
nition of conditional probability,  
 
 
 
In light of these considerations, how can we go from the probability of the conse-
quent given the antecedent, determined by observing some relative frequency, to the 
probability of the material conditional? But why should we not, then, determine di-
rectly the conditional probability of the conclusion given the premise and take that as 
the epistemic probability of both the warrant and the conclusion? Why make the on-
tological/epistemic qualifier distinction? Indeed, why speak of the probability of the 
warrant at all? Why not simply, on the basis of some objective procedure, determine 
the conditional probability of the conclusion given the reason and ascribe it to the 
conclusion as an epistemic probability directly and not be concerned to ascribe modal 
qualifiers to either warrant or data? What more work does the distinction do than in-
dicate that the epistemic probability is objectively determined? 
 Bermejo-Luque makes some remarks that may answer our question. Ontological 
qualifiers qualify claims (i.e. statements in general) while epistemic qualifiers qualify 
acts of concluding (p. 173). “Acts of concluding are attempts at saying what our rea-
sons entitle us to say about how the world is” (p. 173). Hence, the epistemic qualifier 
“necessarily” qualifying a conclusion indicates that the claim follows necessarily from 
the reasons and not that the claim itself is necessary, and similarly for the qualifier 
“probably”. To the extent that a modal qualifier applies to the conclusion itself, it 
qualifies its pragmatic force. Still, seeing the qualifier attaching to the conclusion is 
highly misleading, since it suggests that the conclusion itself is categorically necessary 
or probable. I believe that in a diagrammatic representation of an argument’s struc-
ture, the modal qualifier should attach not to the conclusion, but to the arrow indicat-
ing the claim of support from premises to conclusion. Toulmin’s method of 
representing qualifiers as modifying the conclusion leads to the sorts of problems 
which I have just been descrying. 
 Toulmin, however, was motivated by an insight worth preserving. Parallel to the 
force/criterion distinction for evaluative expressions is a force/criterion distinction 
for modal qualifiers. ‘Force’ is a pragmatic concept indicating the level of commitment 
with which we put forward a claim. Toulmin also recognizes that being justified in as-
5.
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cribing ‘probably’ to a conclusion depends on the argument strength, the weight of 
the evidence one has for that claim. In this connection, Toulmin makes an important 
assertion. “Our probability terms come to serve ... not only to qualify assertions, 
promises, and evaluations themselves, but also as an indication of the strength of the 
backing6 [reasons] which we have for the assertion, evaluation, or whatever” (1958, p. 
90). Toulmin does not seem to realize that this indication gives modal qualifiers a se-
mantic/literal meaning besides their pragmatic/emotive force. It is by virtue of this 
literal meaning that modal qualifiers make a claim about the strength of support pre-
mises give for their conclusions. Modal qualifiers are thus tricky. Their literal meaning 
qualifies the claim that the premises support the conclusion. Their pragmatic meaning 
qualifies the level of commitment by which one puts forward the claim. Logical or 
semantic appraisal however concerns the literal meaning. Seeing the qualifier as attach-
ing to the conclusion of an argument only confuses the issues when appraising an ar-
gument from the semantic viewpoint. 
 From this viewpoint, we need a way to appraise the extent of the ground adequacy 
of premises for conclusion and on that basis determine whether the literal meaning of 
the qualifier correctly describes that strength. In short, we need a theory of epistemic 
strength. For literal claims of conclusive strength, the classical theory of logical en-
tailment is ready at hand. (But see footnote 1.) For literal claims of defeasible strength, 
a theory of epistemic probability needs to be developed. Bermejo-Luque has in effect 
suggested a frequency interpretation theory. This will not do as we have argued at 
length in (2009), and the development of a full theory of epistemic probability remains 
an open question. Given a proper answer, Bermejo-Luque can then address how 
pragmatic value depends on semantic value. 
REFERENCES 
Bermejo-Luque, Lilian. 2011. Giving Reasons: A Linguistic-Pragmatic Approach to Argumentation Theory. Dor-
drecht: Springer. 
Cohen, L. Jonathan. 1977. The Probable and the Provable. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Freeman, James B. 2009. Is Epistemic Probability Pascalian? 
 http://www.hunter.cuny.edu/philosophy/repository/essays-by-james-freeman/is-epistemic-
probability-pascalian.pdf (accessed June 1, 2011). 
Hitchcock, David. 1985. Enthymematic Arguments. Informal Logic 7: 83-97. 
Hitchcock. David. 1998. Does the Traditional Treatment of Enthymemes Rest on a Mistake? Argumenta-
tion 12: 15-37. 
Quine, W. V. 1970. Philosophy of Logic. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
Toulmin, Stephen. 1958. The Uses of Argument. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
                                                     
6 “Backing” is not to be taken here in the technical sense Toulmin later gives to it in (1958). 
The Logical Dimension of Argumentation and Its Semantic Appraisal 
Theoria 72 (2011): 289-299 
299
JAMES B. FREEMAN is Professor of Philosophy at Hunter College of The City University of New York, spe-
cializing in logic and argumentation theory. He is the author of four books in the field including Accept-
able Premises: An Epistemic Approach to an Informal Logic Problem (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 
and Argument Structure: Representation and Theory (Springer, 2011), and many papers including 
“Systematizing Toulmin’s Warrants: An Epistemic Approach,” Argumentation 19: 331-346 (2005) and 
“Evaluating Conductive Arguments: Critical Questions in Light of the Toulmin Model,” Conductive Argu-
ments, (London: College Publications), forthcoming.  
ADDRESS: Department of Philosophy, Hunter College of The City University of New York, 695 Park Ave, 
New York, NY 10065, USA. E-mail: jfreeman@hunter.cuny.edu 
